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Focusing on Fowler’s (1981) faith development theory (FDT), this article presents a
modification of structural–developmental theory of religion. The primacy of cogni-
tivedevelopmentasmotorandguidelineofreligiousdevelopmentiscalledintoques-
tion. The new model, the typology of religious styles, is aimed at accounting more
fully for the life-history- and life-world-relatedness of religion, at its principal inter-
active, interpersonal origin and shape. Thus the phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty
(1962, 1988) and Ricoeur (1985/1988, 1990/1992) who provide philosophical per-
spectives, Noam’s (1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1990) developmental perspective,
which is based on interpersonality, as well as Rizzuto’s (1979, 1991) view of the
psychodynamicdevelopmentofreligion,playasignificantroleforthereformulation.
An overview of styles is described and illustrated in a figure. References to results of
empirical research are included, and an explanation of fundamentalism is outlined
that follows from the religious styles perspective.
In Fowler’s (1981) faith development theory (FDT), we have, on the one hand, an
indispensable explanatory tool for the religious diversity of modernity and
postmodern times—a diversity that is becoming even more diverse, as inner (bio-
graphical)andouter(societal)religiouspluralityisgrowing—spawning fromnew
religious and fundamentalist orientations to a deep but rather diffuse hunger for
spirituality. On the other hand, the faith development paradigm, with its focus on
religiouscognitionanditsalmostunquestionedadoptionofthestructural–develop-
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100131, D–33501 Bielefeld, Germany.mental“logicofdevelopment,”needstobequalifiedinordertoaccountfortherich
and deep life-world- and life-history-related dimensions of religion—but also of
fundamentalistturns.Inmyproposalofaclassificationofreligiousstyles,Iwantto
clear up part of this ambiguity and to try a new start in theory and research.
CRITIQUE
It is my view that cognitively based theorists have overlooked the central structuring
activities of the self by defining the epistemic self as the sole representative of struc-
ture.Intheprocess,Ibelieve,thecartwasplacedbeforethehorse,lifehistorybecame
content to the structure of the epistemic self. … Epistemology replaced life history.
(Noam, 1990, p. 378)
With these words, Noam stated the point of the problem. The metaphor of the cart
(cognitive competencies), which the theories of cognition have placed before the
horse (the life history), refers also and above all to the neglect of the emotional,
psychodynamic dimension. This critique also concerns the cognitive–structural the-
oriesofreligiousdevelopment.Amoresubstantialregardforthepsychoanalyticand
psychosocial would lead to displacement of the cognitive–structural view as the ex-
clusive key theory. Noam’s aim thus was “going beyond Piaget” (Noam, 1990).1
Briefly, I summarize the critique of FDT, which I stated elsewhere (Streib,
1991, 1997). It is justified to speak of reductions with regard to religious develop-
ment whenever the cognitive developmental logic is deemed to be not only the
central theme, but also the motor of religious development, thus excluding dimen-
sions of content, experiences, and function of religion. The shift of emphasis to,
eventheoverburdeningof,cognitivedevelopmentisonefaceofthecoin;theother
is the disregard for dimensions that are just as crucial for the constitution and de-
velopment of religion:
• The psychodynamic–interpersonal dimension (the psychodynamic of the
self–self relationship).
• The relational–interpersonal dimension (the dynamic of the self–Other
relationship).
• The interpretative–hermeneutic dimension (the dynamic of the self–tradi-
tion relationship).
• Thelife-worlddimension(thedynamicoftheself–socialworldrelationship).
I therefore plead in favor of removing an obstacle to more-perspectiveness on
religious development: The primacy of the cognitive structures as motor and
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1See also, Noam and Kegan (1982). One could also speak of converting the theories of religious de-
velopment“fromtopdowntobottomup,”asSutterandCharlton(1994)proposedforPiagetiantheory.guideline of religious development should be terminated. We should stop placing
the cart before the horse. Instead, life history and life world, as shall now be ex-
plained,shouldmoveintothefocusofthedevelopmentalperspectiveonreligion.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MORE-PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT
Philosophically, the new perspective finds support in the writings of the French
phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty (1988) and Ricoeur (1990/1992). Notwithstand-
ing some differences of opinion, they contradict a developmental perspective that is
associated with decentration, suggesting a different concept of decentration.2 For a
path of “going beyond Piaget,” Merleau-Ponty’s (1988) lectures at the Sorbonne
from 1949 to 1952 are of special importance because there, based on his
phenomenological key concept of perception and of being-in-the-world, he devel-
ops, in explicit contrast to Piaget,3 a portrait of a unique logic in infancy and child-
hood—that thus contradicts its interpretation as prelogic, as Piaget would
say—which leads to a new perspective on the development of language acquisition,
of children’s drawings, of their causality, and of their self–Other relationship.
One of the important contributions from phenomenology, as presented in
Ricoeur’s (1975/1981, 1981, 1985/1988, 1990/1992) and Merleau-Ponty’s (1962,
1988) works, thus, is the decisive account for the primacy of the life world and of
theOther—theinternalandexternalOther.ForarevisionofFDT,Ithereforerefer
toandmakeuseoftwodevelopmentalperspectives,whichIunderstandaswaysof
genuinepsychologicalexplicationoftheprimacyoflifeworldandOtherandfrom
which I have adopted not only terminological but also conceptual decisions.
First, I include Noam’s (1985, 1988b, 1988c, 1990) and Noam, Powers, Kil-
kenny,andBeedy’s(1991)critiquesandmoderationoftheexclusiveattributionof
developmental dynamic to the development of cognition, and their fresh approach
to the developmental dynamic in terms of interpersonal relationships. Biography,
in a broad, multiperspective understanding, redirects primacy to interpersonality,
social relationships, and life world as the basis for life history. This has decisive
implications for religious development.
Second, for my revision I refer to the psychodynamic tradition represented by
Erikson’s (1968) and Rizzuto’s (1979, 1991, 1996) work and to their contribution
to an understanding of life history. Rizzuto’s contribution is of special importance
because she has integrated the development of God representations into the
psychodynamic view. Religious development appears in a new light when the
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2For a more detailed account of Ricoeur’s philosophy, including the problem of decentration—and
its critical implication for FDT, see Streib (1991).
3For an extensive reconstruction of the dialog between Merleau-Ponty and Piaget that never took
place (because Piaget did not respond to Merleau-Ponty), see Liebsch (1992).mother–child dyad is understood as the origin of religion, when the transitional
space between caretaker and child and the transitional objects that arise here are
assumedtobetheoriginoftheGodrepresentations.Religion,then,isconceivedas
a basically interactive process; religious development can be correlated with the
development of object relations in a psychoanalytic perspective.
I therefore appreciate the extensive references to psychoanalytic contributions
about infancy and early childhood that Fowler (1996) included to offer a rich de-
scription of the early stages. Although I agree with this portrait of the origin of
faithinearlychildhood,Isuggestthatthisportraitoffaithandfaithdevelopmentis
expanded on the other stages or styles of faith, and I do not agree, without qualifi-
cation, which I will explicate later, with Fowler’s statement that the faith stages
could still be “held to be invariant, sequential, and hierarchical”(p. 57).
The focus on interpersonality is common to both theoretical perspectives, which
IrefertoaskeycontributionstoarevisionofFDT:Therelationshipoftheindividual
tointerpersonalothersinthesocialenvironment(externalobjects)andtherelationto
objects in terms of object-relations theory (internal objects) parallel each other and
interrelate. Religious development is a complex process of entangled factors: of
structural development, of schemata of interpersonal relationships, and of themata,
which are presented to the individual by experiences—and sometimes traumas—in
earlier life history and that may change and vary as the interpersonal, social, and so-
cietal relationships change over a lifetime. Thus the view that is closest to my per-
spective is the one by Noam (1988a, 1988c, 1990) who suggested understanding
development as the complex interrelation of themata and schemata.
DIMENSIONS OF A CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS STYLE
The revision of FDT rests on the assumption that interpersonal relationships and
theirpsychodynamicsarebothindicatorsandpromotersofreligiousdevelopment.
The concept of style suggests placing more emphasis on the factors of life history
and life world for religious development. Noam (1985; see also Noam, Powers,
Kilkenny,&Beedy,1991)madeuseofthestyleconceptinthissense.Ishallexpli-
catetheconceptofreligiousstylebyhighlightingthreeofitsmostdecisivedimen-
sions: (a) the self–Other dynamic as related to the psychodynamic history of
themata; (b) the narrative character of biography; and (c) the life-world aspect,
which qualifies life history as milieu sequence.
Religious Styles, the Self–Other Dynamics, and the
Psychodynamic History of Themata
LifehistoryisdeterminedbythedynamicsoftheSelf–Otherinteraction.Thisinter-
action has its own history, which may coagulate into life themes or themata. Reli-
gioussymbolizationandritualizationarealsomeansofexpression;weusethemto
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areinterpersonal.Inasmuchasinterpersonalityhasahistory,beginningwithevents
lyingfarback,andhasyieldedcertainpatternsofreligiouscommunicationandreli-
gious styles elaborated at that time, present styles should not be conceived of as
emergingindependentlyandsuddenlyinthehereandnowbutratherashavingtheir
roots in life history. Such Self–Other dynamics in life-historical perspective thus
implies the inclusion of psychodynamic patterns of explanation, as in Erikson’s
(1968) and Rizzuto’s (1979, 1991, 1996) perspectives.
It is possible to identify three interesting impulses in Fowler’s (1981) theory in this
regard: First, in his interpretation of the interview with Mary5—the psychosocial per-
spective played the veritable role of a second pillar, emphasizing the psychodynamic,
life history, but also the life world as psychodynamic resources here—Fowler gave
theoretical and empirical prominence to Erikson’s (1968) work. Second, Fowler
(1987) took a significant step toward taking up psychodynamic models by correlating
his own stages of faith with those of Kegan (1982). Third, Fowler (1996) adopted, at
least for the early stages of faith, Rizzuto’s (1979) approach, which mostly relies on
Winnicott (1971) and Erikson for her own view of religious development in a
psychodynamic perspective.
It would, however, be a decisive step forward to integrate the relevance of life
themataasproposedbyNoam(1990,1996)intoreligiousdevelopmentasawhole.
It must be expected that interpersonal experiences and formative life themata
reemergefromthestorageofourpsychicalresources.Suchlifethematathusrepre-
sent a challenge to the competencies or schemata that we use to work on the
themata in the present.
Religious Style and the Narrative Character of Biography
Thesignificanceofthemataforreligiousdevelopmentandforthepreferenceforre-
ligious styles can be understood even better when we say they are a matter of
scripts,ofpersonalmyths,ofstories,andwhenwetakeintoaccountthattheyareof
narrativecharacter.Withregardtotheformationofidentity,itispossibletoreferto
Ricoeur(1985/1988)whoanalyzedourinterwovennesswithinafabricofstoriesas
the ground for identity (Streib, 1994).
Withregardtothecognitive–structuraltheories,theconclusionisthis:Notonly
are operations and structures relevant for development but also narratives are sig-
nificant for life history. This has already been pointed out by Freeman (1984,
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4The character of religion as means to communicate something is also the starting point of Day’s
(1993) approach to a definition of religion.
5Fowler devoted an entire chapter to reproducing and interpreting this interview with a
young woman (i.e., Fowler, 1981, chap. 22); see also, the evaluation of Nelson and Aleshire
(1986).1985, 1991). For moral development theory, the approaches of a narrative
reformulation6havebeenconcretizedtoapleaforanarrativeturn(Day&Tappan,
1996). The self–Other interaction has a narrative character dealing with narra-
tivelystructuredthemata.Accordingly,anarrativeturnshouldbeproposedforthe
theoretical and empirical analysis of religious development and socialization. The
communication of the present styles always is, at the same time, the telling of the
genealogicalstory,usingearlierstorymaterial;theconsolidationofapresentstyle
embraces the narrative integration and retelling of earlier styles.
Religious Styles and Life World: Life History as Milieu
Sequence
If a more-perspective concept of style is to be unfolded for religion, it is necessary
to emphasize, besides its focus on life history, its life-world conditionedness as
well. Localization within the life world, however, is only the alternate side of
life-historicallocalization.AsGrathoff(1995)statesfromaphenomenologicaland
sociological perspective, biography is to be investigated “as milieu sequence and
lifecontextofthemilieu.”Thepreferenceforareligiousstyleanditsdevelopment
grows within the web of the everyday life world, from the milieus constituting
meaning intersubjectively. Within our line of argument, referring to the life-world
perspective is of special corrective relevance for the theories of cognitive–struc-
turaldevelopment,whichare—andnotunjustly—reproachedforfavoringindivid-
ualism.7Thesociophenomenologicallocalizationofreligionandofreligiousstyles
has its point in a narrative perspective as well: in the particular attention to the
narrativity of the life-world constitution and genesis of religion and its styles.
THE RELIGIOUS STYLES PERSPECTIVE
Religious Styles: A Definition
Summarizingthecharacteristicsofarevisedperspectiveonreligiousdevelopment
in terms of religious styles, I shall give a condensed definition:
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6For some years, Day has been working on a narrative reformulation of Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984)
moral development theory (see Day, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1993).
7Broughton’s(1986)andHull’s(1991)politicalandsociologicalcritiquesofFowler’s(1981)theory
note that the developing individual, in Fowler’s perspective, seems to have been detached from the so-
cial context; the references to the life world seem problematical, especially for the higher,
postconventional stages.Religious styles are distinct modi8 of practical–interactive (ritual), psychodynamic
(symbolic),9 and cognitive (narrative) reconstruction and appropriation10 of religion,
thatoriginateinrelationtolifehistoryandlifeworldandthat,inaccumulativedeposi-
tion, constitute the variations and transformations of religion over a life time, corre-
sponding to the styles of interpersonal relations.
A multilayeredness of religious styles, which can be designated as internal plu-
ralism, corresponds to the determined more-perspectiveness. The so-called mile-
stone model, brought into discussion by Loevinger (1976), is therefore better
suited to illustrate religious style development than stage-wise, ascending models.
The milestone model draws the respective style as a rising curve that descends
again after a culminating point and persists on a lower level, whereas the subse-
quent styles attain their own climaxes. From such developmental perspective,
therearenoplausiblereasons,either,whyacertainstyleshouldnot,atleastaspre-
cursor, develop earlier than structural–developmental theories normally assume,
but especially that a potential relevance of a certain style continues after its bio-
graphical peak.
This model not only qualifies the hierarchical order of stages but also it ex-
presses the multilayeredness of religious orientations at a certain point in lifetime
and questions the structural–developmental principle of invariant sequence and of
structured whole. Hierarchy needs to be differentiated because, at a certain devel-
opmental phase, it may be the best thing for an individual to be embedded in a cer-
tainstyle,asKegan(1982)powerfullypointedout;here,rather,thedevelopmental
task is working on and coping with the integration of previous styles. But there are
also times of transition when we have to regard the following style better for the
person, his or her religion, and psychic health. The claims of invariance and se-
quentialityneedtobemodifiedandtheassumptionofstructuredwholenessshould
be dropped for religious development, when we assume that the most decisive
structuring power for the transformation of religion emerges from the
themata-loaded domain of the interpersonal, the psychodynamic, and from social
relationships.
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8Modus indicates that it is, in the first place, the way, the structure, or the pattern that characterizes a
certainstyle.Anyway,Iavoidtalkingaboutstructurebecause,inthefamilyofstructural–developmen-
taltheories,structuresignifiesveryspecificallythecognitive–operationalstructureandtendstoconfine
the perspective to the structuralist marginalization of life world and life history.
9Psychodynamicreconstructionandappropriationrefertothetaskofreligion,whichmeansdealing
and coping with themata and psychosocial challenges.
10Reconstruction and appropriation caution against (the misunderstanding of) a specific
constructivist perspective that gives predominance or even exclusivity to the “constructive activity of
the ego” (Fowler, 1980/1986), tending to ignore the (phenomenological) conviction that the individ-
ual’s construction always relates to and relays on manifestations of religion that precede the individual
meaning-maker (Streib, 1991).Religious Styles: An Overview
Because the religious styles are conceived of as different modi of reconstruction
and appropriation of religion that parallel the interpersonal styles, the
styles’descriptionsfollowNoam’s(1988a,1988b,1988c,1990,1992)descriptions
of interpersonal schemata. The graphical model that appears to be the most ade-
quate to describe the individual development of religious styles is the model of ac-
cumulative deposition of layers (Figure 1).
Subjective religious style. The subjective religious style corresponds to
Noam’s(1988c,1990)phaseofthesubjective–physicalselfinearlychildhood.Al-
though the symbiotic relation to the caretakers still prevails, in that mirroring can
takeplaceandbasictrustcanemerge,egocentricityisthebasicpattern—theinfant
regardshimorherselfasthecenteroftheworld.Itisthephaseinwhichtheambiva-
lenceoftrustandmistrustisatstake;thehealthyoutcomeofthisphaseisthedevel-
opment of basic trust.
Theinfantbegins,accordingtoStern(1985),todevelop“evokedcompanions;”
theemergenceofthesubjectiveselfgivesrisetosharedframeworksandfantasies.
Thusinthisstyle,correspondingtoFowler’s(1981)intuitive–projectivefaith,fan-
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FIGURE 1 Religious styles.tasy, images, and feelings arise that in the course of further development play a
continuous role. Intuition and impulsiveness however indicate playfulness and
readiness for variation; the fantasies and images are always open for change and a
new gestalt. This corresponds to the origin of religion and the development of the
GodrepresentationinRizzuto’s(1979)terms:therepresentationalobject,asmuch
itmayowetothespecificchild–caretakerrelationship,ismovingontoavarietyof
objects that may be “cathected.”
Rizzuto’s (1979) description of the emerging and developing God representa-
tion in early childhood directs attention to yet another dimension: When the God
representationisseentobeshapedbyidealized,andevenaggrandizedparentalim-
ages, the image of The Almighty emerges, who is supposed to see and to punish. In
the subjective religious style, we have to reckon with lawfulness and the judicious
or, as Fowler (1996) says, of the “taskmaster deity who requires performance and
perfection, or shame and guilt about failures” (p. 59).
Instrumental–reciprocal or “do-ut-des” religious style. Thesecondstyle,
the instrumental–reciprocal or “do-ut-des” religious style, makes use of the devel-
opment of an inner self as distinguished from an outer self, when the child becomes
awareofhisorherownneedsandinterestsasopposedtothoseofotherpeople.Thus
one’s own needs and desires can become part of a reciprocal exchange. Noam’s
(1988c, 1990) “reciprocal–instrumental self” points to this structure. Also in regard
to religion, the do-ut-des relationship is the basic pattern for both the interpersonal
andtheGod–humanrelationship:“Good”iswhatGodandtheauthoritypersonswish
and demand; “bad” is what results in punishment and mischief; means of trade are
obedience and fulfillment of religious commandments. The psychodynamic chal-
lenges concentrate on the crisis of “Initiative versus Guilt,” but are also already on
“Industry versus Inferiority.” The God representation, to adopt Rizzuto’s (1979)
terms, concentrates on more or less aggrandized parental images.
Fowler’s (1981) characterization of this style’s pattern of understanding as
“mythic–literal” described another aspect: Religious images and feelings are inte-
grated in a story; myths play an important role. An awareness of the metaphoric or
symbolic difference, however, may not be developed, which would allow us to
change details of the story or religious rule. Literally everything happened pre-
ciselyastoldinthestory;literallyeverythinghastobeobservedexactlyasthereli-
gious rules prescribe.
It is obvious that this description of the reciprocal–instrumental style—and the
anxiety-laden, juridical dimension of the subjective style—portrays the funda-
mentalist worldview and attitude. However, we do not call children fundamental-
ists, but we regard these styles as adequate in infancy and childhood. Only their
continuity or revival in adolescence and adulthood is the characteristic of funda-
mentalism, as will be explained later.
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theemergenceofanewreligiousstylethatrestsonthemutualityofrelationshipsin
one’s religious group and prefers an image of God as a personal partner. To be re-
spectedandlovedbyothersismostimportant.Mutualityalsoisthesoilinwhichal-
truism and overidentification with others may grow. The unquestioned security in
one’sreligiousgrouporthedependenceontheirjudgmentrevealsthatitisdifficult
totranscendtheideologicalandinstitutionalgrouplimits,andifonereligioushome
has been left, another will be searched for desperately.
It deepens our understanding of the psychodynamic processes involved in the
mutual religious style that “new objects” may join the originally cathected objects
(Rizzuto, 1979), which could result in an “inestimable shifting.” This helps to un-
derstand the sometimes severe changes in content, experience, and function of re-
ligion,especiallyinadolescence.Althoughtheseshiftsandchangescanberadical,
thepsychodynamicsofmutualityistheprevalentmodusandfeatureofthisstyle.
Individuative–systemic religious style. The understanding of the social
worldasasysteminwhichIhavetotakemypositionisthecharacterizationofthis
style. Also, in religion—God, society, religious community, the human—all have
theirwell-definedplaceandtheirrole.Reflectiononreligiousmatters,theabilityto
give reasons for one’s beliefs or skepticisms, is the cognitive aspect of this style.
The negative effect of this kind of rationality for religious texts and rituals is that
theyaredeprivedoftheirsymbolicqualityandreducedtopropositionalstatements.
It supports and deepens our understanding of the psychodynamic processes
when we reckon with an “emotional distance from representations” and with a
“critical reassessment” (Rizzuto, 1979) in the individuative–systemic style,
whereas,atthesametime,butrootedinthedeeperlayersofthepsyche,thereisthe
hunger for intimacy, identity, relatedness, and trust. This is the psychodynamic
window for reinviting earlier styles for compensation.
Dialogical religious style. The dialogical religious style develops a new
openness for the Other. Dialog here means that contradictions and differences do
notresultinexclusionandhostilitytowardothers.Whenwearenolongerpredomi-
nantly concerned with finding and defending our own religious identity, we are
able to open up to and learn from other people with religious orientations different
from our own.
Here, also, a new openness and valuing of the symbol can develop that, accord-
ing to Ricoeur (1975/1981, 1981), we could call “second naïveté.” Ricoeur’s con-
cept of decentration may be even more powerful and add to our understanding of
dialog: Decentration, according to Ricoeur, means that the subject is drawn into
the power field of a symbol or narrative. “Decentration” means “letting-go” the
self. This parallels Rizzuto’s (1979) notion that, especially in adulthood, there can
be an uncertainty about and a questioning of the God representations—with a pre-
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a trustworthy Other, a new emergence of basic trust.
PLURAL PRESENCE AND THE REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS
STYLES: TOWARD A NEW EXPLANATION OF
FUNDAMENTALISM
Atacertaintimeinlife,acertainstyleappearstobeprevalentandtostructuremost
ofthereligiousactivityandcorrespondinglymostofone’sinterpersonalandsocial
relationships.Beyondthesurfaceofeverydaypraxisandreconstruction,however,
the previous styles are not eliminated, but rather they have disappeared and may
havebeenforgotten.Asingeologicallayers,wherepreviousagesofourplanetare
invisible from the surface but nevertheless present and available, earlier religious
styles are present and available in our psychic resources.
Butunlikegeologicallayers,earlierreligiousstylescallforattention;theyrequire
workingthroughanddemanddistanceationandintegration;earlierorientationsneed
revisitingandreflection.Underhealthyconditions,thisworkingthroughmeansboth
distanceation and integration in order to consolidate the present style. The ability to
playwithanddealwith—reflexivelyandsometimesironically—one’sownandoth-
ers’earlierstylesistheindicatorofahealthyintegration.Itmeanstotellandretell,to
read and rewrite the story of one’s own life in terms or symbols of religion.
In some cases, however, earlier religious styles are revitalized and regain part
of their unquestioned and unreflected power over one’s surface orientation and
praxis. Using the geological metaphor again, I view this as conflict, fracture, and
dislocationofreligiousstylesandsuggestcallingthisreemergenceofearlierstyles
a revival of earlier religious styles. Most obviously this is the case in fundamental-
ist biographies.
I refer to the interpretation of fundamentalism here as one example of the inno-
vative results of the religious styles perspective. To understand fundamentalists,
we have to deal with puzzling questions like these: How does it fit together that a
person,ontheonehand,isabletodealwitheverydaysituationssuccessfullyonthe
basisofpracticalreasonand,forexample,isabletodesignandcontroltechnologi-
cal machines of high complexity—remember that a significant number of funda-
mentalists are graduates from our universities—and that the same person, in
matters of collective and personal future, in matters of meaning, in matters of reli-
gion, resorts to the most simple answers, subjects to the grand simplificateurs? In
termsofdevelopmentaltheory,howcanweunderstandthatapersonisabletoper-
formformaloperationsinmostdomainsofeverydaylifeandthatthissameperson
takes every word of a guru or fundamentalist leader as the revelation of truth?
While traditional developmental theories lack an explanation because they do
not account for regression but are assuming a “structural whole,” the religious
styles perspective suggests an understanding: Fundamentalism is the prevalence
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do-ut-desjuridicalstructure,aprevalenceorrevivalofthereciprocal–instrumental
styleandpartofthesubjectivestyle.11Theseadvancetoshapetheapproachtoreli-
gious matters, but other styles that have already been developed and are used in
other dimensions of a person’s life are not applied to religion. A conflict and frac-
ture of styles occurs.
Thiscouldbedemonstratedfromtheresultsofourbiographical–reconstructive
research projects on Christian–fundamentalist converts and deconverts12 and on
adolescents who are fascinated with the occult.13 As our interview material sug-
gests, many adolescents appear to have already moved beyond the modern para-
digm in their religious development: It is not the nice, invariant teleological
sequence, nor a structural whole, but rather style diversity and style revival.
The model that I have presented may help to understand not only the develop-
ment of fundamentalism, but also its obstinate stability: The earlier styles not only
reemerge, but also they become predominant in matters of religion. Parallel to the
understanding of fundamentalism as “modern” antimodernism,14 I do not regard
the subjective and the do-ut-des styles as the same as they were in infancy and
childhood, but later style patterns, mutual or systemic, merge with the reemerging
residuals.Notonlyarevivalbutalsoakindof“heterodyning”ofstylestakesplace.
This explains why the fundamentalist orientation is more stable, more rigoristic,
and more cruel: It bestows the earlier styles with the power of mutuality in group
relationships and the power of systemic–rational arguments, or both.
But this blend or heterodyning of religious styles is not completely stable. In
some cases, the mutuality or the individuative reflectiveness resists complete sub-
mission and surrender to the fundamentalist demand. The person experiences a
clash of styles. Especially, persons who are about to leave the fundamentalist ori-
entation develop an awareness of the clash of styles, up to the point where it be-
comes intolerable, as our interview material demonstrates.
Healing, here, means to nurture and strengthen the present style of mutuality or
individuative–systemic reflexivity and its application also in religion. Then the
process of reworking earlier (fundamentalism–generative) style dimensions be-
comespossible.Casestudiesfromourresearchalsoindicatesuchpossibility.Here
again, healing means the ability to tell and retell, to read and rewrite the story of
one’s life in one’s latest available style.15
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11Also, Fowler (1987) mentions such possibility.
12Forresearchresultsanddiscussion,seeStreib(2000b,2001);forabriefsummaryintheofficialfi-
nal report of the Enquête Commission, see Streib (1999b); for the more detailed research report, see
Streib (1998; 2000a).
13Forabriefsummary,seeStreib(1999a);forafull-lengthaccountofcasestudies,interpretation,and
conclusions, see Streib and Schöll (2001).
14For the sociological interpretation of fundamentalism as “modern anti-modernism,” see Küenzlen
(1996). See also, Keupp (1994) and Drehsen (1994).CONCLUDING REMARKS
A philosophical footnote to close: It cannot be overlooked that the cognitive–structural
theories of development, in their traditional shape of structural, hierarchical, sequential,
andirreversiblelogicofdevelopmentareduetoanalltoooptimisticinterpretationofthe
project of modernity. If unchanged, they cannot provide us with an explanatory frame-
work for understanding fundamentalism and individual fundamentalist revivals. The
modificationofthedevelopmentalmodel,whichhasbeenpresented,takesaccountofthe
factthattheprojectofmodernityisexposedtogravedisturbances.Iamthussketchingthe
developmental psychology variant of a fundamental problem of modernity: the smooth
teleological meta-story of modernity16—and the respective meta-story of development
obliged to it—is challenged and impelled to modify by postmodern disturbances. Such
disturbances also include individual and global fundamentalisms that again are based to
no small degree on meta-stories themselves.
The religious style perspective suggests an answer to these postmodern challenges
and opens a perspective of development and transformation beyond the fundamental-
istrevivals.Itiswellunderstoodastheattempttoaccountforthecomprehensivepara-
digmatic shift and revision—that exceeds, of course, the domain of religion and of
cognitive development: the shift from disconnected reason to relational knowing,
from universality to bodily being-in-the-life world, from objectivity to object relation,
from decentrated subjectivity to openness for the Other. Or, to recall some names: to
revise Piagetian structural teleology with Ricoeur’s (1985/1988, 1990/1992) and
Merleau-Ponty’s (1962, 1988) phenomenology.
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